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Abstract
Suppose some data have been encrypted, can you compute with the data
without decrypting them? This problem has been studied as homomorphic
encryption and blind computing. We consider this problem in the context
of quantum information processing, and present the definitions of quantum
homomorphic encryption (QHE) and quantum fully homomorphic encryp-
tion (QFHE). Then, based on quantum one-time pad (QOTP), we construct
a symmetric QFHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm depends on the
secret key. This scheme permits any unitary transformation on any n-qubit
state that has been encrypted. Compared with classical homomorphic en-
cryption, the QFHE scheme has perfect security. Finally, we also construct
a QOTP-based symmetric QHE scheme, where the evaluate algorithm is in-
dependent of the secret key.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, homomorphic encryption, quantum
one-time pad, perfect security, privacy-preserving quantum computing
1. Introduction
Suppose you have encrypted some data, you intend to compute with the
data, but you do not want to decrypt them. Is it possible to compute with
the encrypted data without decryption?
This problem is related with the study “information processing with en-
crypted data” or “privacy-preserving quantum computing”. It has been in-
vestigated a lot in modern cryptography, and includes the studies of homo-
morphic encryption [1] and blind computing [2, 3]. It was first considered by
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Rivest et al. who suggest some homomorphic encryption schemes [1]. How-
ever, these schemes are insecure [4]. Later, more results are proposed about
homomorphic encryption and fully homomorphic encryption [5, 6]. These
are constructed based on some hard computational problems in mathemat-
ics, and their security relies on the computational difficulty of these mathe-
matical problems. Thus they have just computational security. In addition,
symmetric homomorphic encryption [7–9] is also an useful and interesting
research, and it has higher efficiency. Though its encryption key is the same
as the decryption key, it is sufficient for many application.
Based on the theory of quantum mechanics, lots of quantum crypto-
graphic protocols [10–12] have been proposed, and have unconditional se-
curity. This stimulates us to consider the above problem in the context
of quantum information, and intend to get a more secure solution to the
privacy-preserving quantum computing. The closely related with the prob-
lem includes: 1) blind quantum computing [13–23], where one party dele-
gates quantum computation to another party without revealing his data and
result; 2) quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) [24], which allows quan-
tum data to be manipulated without decrypting; 3) quantum private query
[25], which is used to query a database while keeping the query secret; and
4) quantum private comparison [26–30], which allows two parties to compare
their secret data without revealing the secret.
This paper considers the problem of homomorphic encryption in the con-
text of quantum information processing: suppose arbitrary quantum plain-
text σ has been encrypted (the ciphertext is E(σ)), can we perform any quan-
tum operator directly on the ciphertext (without decrypting the ciphertext)
and obtain the desired state E(T (σ))? The state E(T (σ)) is the ciphertext
of the result of performing quantum operator T on the original plaintext σ.
Rohde et al. [24] studied quantum walk with encrypted data, and pro-
posed a limited QHE scheme using the Boson sampling and multi-walker
quantum walk models. This QHE scheme can be used in blind computing of
quantum walk. However, QHE has still not been defined and quantum fully
homomorphic encryption (QFHE) scheme has not been constructed.
We study the quantum information processing with encrypted data from
the aspect of QHE. The definitions of QHE and QFHE have been presented,
and some concrete schemes including QFHE scheme have been constructed.
All these schemes are constructed based on quantum one-time pad (QOTP)
[31, 32], and have perfect security.
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2. Concepts
In Ref. [24], a limited QHE scheme was presented using the Boson sam-
pling and multi-walker quantum walk models. However, no definition of QHE
or QFHE has been given, and no QFHE scheme has been constructed.
QHE can be either symmetric or asymmetric. Both of the two kinds
will be defined, but we will focus on the symmetric QHE. All the schemes
constructed in the next sections are symmetric QHE schemes.
Quantum states are usually written in the form of density matrices, de-
noted as ρ, σ. The output states of quantum operators T, E are also repre-
sented as density matrices.
Definition 1: A symmetric quantum homomorphic encryption scheme
∆ has the following four algorithms:
1. Key Generating algorithm KeyGen∆ is used to generate a key key;
2. Encrypt∆ is the encryption algorithm: ρ = E(key, σ), where σ is the
quantum plaintext;
3. Decrypt∆ is the decryption algorithm: σ = D(key, ρ), where ρ is the
quantum ciphertext;
4. The algorithm Evaluate∆ is used to process the quantum ciphertext
without decryption. Evaluate∆ is associated to a set F∆ of permitted
quantum operators. For any quantum operator T ∈ F∆, according
to the key key and quantum ciphertext ρ, it performs the algorithm
Evaluate∆(key, T, ρ), and can output a quantum state which is just
the ciphertext E(key, T (σ)).
It should be noticed that there exists a case that the algorithm Evaluate∆
is independent of the key. In this case, it should be written asEvaluate∆(T, ρ)
in the above definition. So, the symmetric QHE can be divided into two
classes: 1) symmetric QHE with encryption key, where the algorithm Evaluate∆
is executed using the encryption key; and 2) symmetric QHE without en-
cryption key, where the algorithm Evaluate∆ is executed without using the
encryption key.
Definition 2: An asymmetric quantum homomorphic encryption scheme
∆ has the following four algorithms:
1. Key Generating algorithm KeyGen∆ is used to generate two keys – a
public key pk and a secret key sk;
2. Encrypt∆ is the encryption algorithm: ρ = E(pk, σ), where σ is the
quantum plaintext;
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3. Decrypt∆ is the decryption algorithm: σ = D(sk, ρ), where ρ is the
quantum ciphertext;
4. The algorithm Evaluate∆ is used to process the quantum ciphertext
without decryption. Evaluate∆ is associated to a set F∆ of permitted
quantum operators. For any quantum operator T ∈ F∆, according to
the public key pk and quantum ciphertext ρ, it performs the algorithm
Evaluate∆(pk, T, ρ), and can output a quantum ciphertext which can
be decrypted as T (σ) with the secret key sk.
Compared with the usual encryption scheme, the QHE scheme has a
fourth algorithm Evaluate∆, which is used to process the encrypted data.
For example, the algorithm Evaluate∆ may be described as this: from the key
and the quantum operator T ∈ F∆, it generates another quantum operator
T ′ and performs it on the quantum ciphertext E(key, σ). In this case, the
operator T ′ is related with the operator T and the key, such that
T ′(E(key, σ)) = E(key, T (σ)). (1)
The operator T can be regarded as an desired operation on the quantum
plaintext. The operation T ′ corresponding to T is performed on the quantum
ciphertext, and can implement the desired operation on the plaintext.
From the definitions of symmetrc/asymmetric QHE scheme, we say the
scheme ∆ can handle all the quantum operators in F∆.
The scheme ∆ is (symmetric or asymmetric) quantum fully homomorphic
encryption scheme, if it can handle all quantum operators and Evaluate∆
is efficient in a similar way as in Ref.[6]. The quantum operator T ∈ F∆
may be uncomputable in polynomial time, and suppose its running time is
ST . We say Evaluate∆ is efficient if there exists a polynomial g such that,
for any quantum operator T ∈ F∆ that can be implemented in time ST ,
Evaluate∆ can be implemented in time at most ST · g(λ), where λ is the
security parameter.
The security of QHE scheme depends on the security of the encryption
algorithm Encrypt∆. In the asymmetric QHE scheme, the security also
depends on the privacy of the secret key sk while the key pk is public.
3. Quantum homomorphic encryption
Some operators are introduced firstly. Four single-qubit operatorsX, Y, Z,H
are shown as follows: X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
,
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H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. Two-qubit operator controlled-NOT is denoted as
CNOT . The rotation operators about the zˆ and yˆ axes are defined by
Rz(θ) = e
−iθZ/2 and Ry(θ) = e−iθY/2. See the Appendix for some of their
commutation rules. All the equations used in this paper can be deduced
from those commutation rules.
In this section, we will firstly present three QHE schemes on single qubit,
whose permitted quantum operators are in the set {Rz(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)},
{Ry(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)} or the union of them. Then a QHE scheme for CNOT is
also constructed.
In the first QHE scheme, the set of permitted quantum operators is
{Rz(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}. The scheme is shown as follows.
QHE scheme 1
KeyGen∆: Randomly select two bits k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1};
Encrypt∆: Compute ρc = X
jZkσmZ
kXj;
Decrypt∆: Compute σm = Z
kXjρcX
jZk;
Evaluate∆: According to k, j, Rz(θ), it performs quantum operator Rz(θ
′)
on the given quantum ciphertext ρc, where θ
′ = (−1)jθ.
It can be verified that
Rz((−1)jθ)XjZk = XjZkRz(θ), (2)
where k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1}. According to Eq.(2), the output state of the
algorithm Evaluate∆ is
Rz((−1)jθ)ρcRz((−1)jθ)† = XjZk(Rz(θ)σmRz(θ)†)ZkXj,
which is just the ciphertext of the state Rz(θ)σmRz(θ)
†. Moreover, no de-
cryption is performed during the computing of Evaluate∆. Thus the scheme
satisfies the definition of symmetric QHE, and all the unitary transforma-
tions in {Rz(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)} are permitted quantum operators of the QHE
scheme.
In the second QHE scheme, the set of permitted quantum operators is
{Ry(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}. The scheme is shown as follows.
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QHE scheme 2
KeyGen∆: Randomly select two bits k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1};
Encrypt∆: Compute ρc = X
jZkσmZ
kXj;
Decrypt∆: Compute σm = Z
kXjρcX
jZk;
Evaluate∆: According to k, j, Ry(θ), it performs quantum operator Ry(θ
′)
on the given quantum ciphertext ρc, where θ
′ = (−1)k+jθ.
It can be verified that
Ry((−1)k+jθ)XjZk = XjZkRy(θ), (3)
where k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1}. According to Eq.(3), the output state of the
algorithm Evaluate∆ is
Ry((−1)k+jθ)ρcRy((−1)k+jθ)† = XjZk(Ry(θ)σmRy(θ)†)ZkXj, (4)
which is just the ciphertext of the state Ry(θ)σmRy(θ)
†. Moreover, no de-
cryption is performed during the computing of Evaluate∆. Thus the scheme
also satisfies the definition of symmetric QHE, and all the unitary transfor-
mations in {Ry(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)} are permitted quantum operators of the QHE
scheme.
Remark 1: The relation Ry((−1)jθ)HjY k = HjY kRy(θ) can be easily
verified. So, in the QHE scheme 2, the encryption/decryption algorithm can
also be modified by replacingXjZk withHjY k, and the algorithm Evaluate∆
performs quantum operator Ry((−1)jθ) on the given quantum ciphertext.
The third QHE scheme can be constructed by combining the scheme 1
and scheme 2, and its permitted quantum operators are in {Rz(θ), Ry(θ)|θ ∈
[0, 2pi)}. The only modification is about the algorithm Evaluate∆, and the
modified Evaluate∆ is described as follow: according to the key k, j and
Rz(θ) (or Ry(θ)), perform quantum operator Rz((−1)jθ) (or Ry((−1)k+jθ))
on the given quantum ciphertext ρc.
Until now, we have presented three symmetric QHE schemes, such that
the permitted quantum operators are in {Rz(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}, {Ry(θ)|θ ∈
[0, 2pi)}, or the union of them. All these schemes are constructed based
on QOTP. In these constructions, each permitted quantum operator T ∈
{Rz(θ), Ry(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)} is corresponding to another quantum operator T ′
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which is directly performed on the quantum ciphertext. Finding the operator
T ′ is the key point to construct a QHE scheme.
Next, we construct a symmetric QHE scheme that permits CNOT oper-
ator. It can be verified that
(XjZk ⊗X lZm)CNOT = CNOT ((−1)j·mZm ⊗Xj)(XjZk ⊗X lZm), (5)
where j, k, l,m are arbitrary four bits. Denote CNOT ′ = CNOT ((−1)j·mZm⊗
Xj), then the Eq.(5) can be written as CNOT ′(XjZk ⊗X lZm) = (XjZk ⊗
X lZm)CNOT , so the operator CNOT ′ is corresponding to CNOT . From
this relation, the QHE scheme can be constructed in the same way as fol-
lows. In the encryption/decryption algorithm, the QOTP is used to en-
crypt/decrypt two qubits with 4-bit key j, k, l,m. According to the key
j, k, l,m, the algorithm Evaluate∆ performs CNOT
′ on the given quantum
ciphertext.
4. Quantum fully homomorphic encryption
Based on the QHE schemes in the previous section, the QFHE scheme can
also be constructed for any n-qubit quantum computation (without quantum
measurements).
From the Ref. [33], any single-qubit unitary transformation can be writ-
ten as the form
U(α, β, γ, δ) = eiαRz(β)Ry(γ)Rz(δ), (6)
where α, β, γ, δ are real numbers in the [0, 2pi). It means all the single-qubit
unitary transformations can be expressed as the set {U(α, β, γ, δ)|α, β, γ, δ ∈
[0, 2pi)}, where U(α, β, γ, δ) = eiαRz(β)Ry(γ)Rz(δ).
According to Eq.(2) and Eq.(3), it can be concluded that
XjZkU(α, β, γ, δ) = eiαXjZkRz(β)Ry(γ)Rz(δ),
= eiαRz((−1)jβ)XjZkRy(γ)Rz(δ),
= eiαRz((−1)jβ)Ry((−1)k+jγ)XjZkRz(δ),
= eiαRz((−1)jβ)Ry((−1)k+jγ)Rz((−1)jδ)XjZk,
= U(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ)XjZk, (7)
where k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1}.
From Eq.(7), any single-qubit unitary operator U(α, β, γ, δ) is correspond-
ing to U(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ). So the QFHE scheme for single-qubit
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computation is constructed in the same way as the construction of QHE
schemes in the previous section.
QFHE on single qubit
KeyGen∆: Randomly select two bits k ∈ {0, 1}, j ∈ {0, 1};
Encrypt∆: Compute ρc = X
jZkσmZ
kXj;
Decrypt∆: Compute σm = Z
kXjρcX
jZk;
Evaluate∆: According to k, j and U(α, β, γ, δ), it performs the unitary trans-
formation U(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ) on the given quantum ci-
phertext ρc.
According to Eq.(7), the output state of the algorithm Evaluate∆ is
XjZk(U(α, β, γ, δ)σmU(α, β, γ, δ)
†)ZkXj.
Thus the scheme also satisfies the definition of symmetric QHE. Moreover,
Evaluate∆ has the same computational complexity with the quantum opera-
tor U(α, β, γ, δ) ∈ F∆, and the set {U(α, β, γ, δ)|α, β, γ, δ ∈ [0, 2pi)} contains
all of the single-qubit unitary transformations, so the above QHE scheme is
fully homomorphic for single-qubit computation.
Notice that while intending to perform any given unitary operator on a
quantum ciphertext, the unitary operator should be firstly decomposed into
the form of Eq.(6) (or computing the four parameters α, β, γ, δ).
Next, we present another scheme, which will be shown to be a QFHE
scheme, and permits any n-qubit unitary transformation.
Any n-qubit unitary transformation can be decomposed as the combi-
nation of some CNOT and single-qubit unitary transformations. Then any
n-qubit computation (without quantum measurements) can be described as
a quantum circuit C, which consists of some CNOT and single-qubit unitary
gates [34]. From the above constructions of QHE schemes, the CNOT gate
or each single-qubit unitary gates U(α, β, γ, δ) can correspond to another
quantum gate CNOT ′ or U(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ). By replacing each
gate in quantum circuit C with the corresponding quantum gate, we can
obtain a new quantum circuit, denoted as C ′. The two quantum circuits C
and C ′ satisfy the relation
C ′(Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗XanZbn) = (Xa1Zb1 ⊗ · · · ⊗XanZbn)C, (8)
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where a = a1 · · · an and b = b1 · · · bn are arbitrary n-bit strings selected from
{0, 1}n. The circuit C ′ is dependent on the circuit C and the two numbers
a, b.
From Eq.(8), the QFHE on n qubits can be constructed as follows. QOTP
is used as the encryption/decryption algorithms again, and it needs a 2n-bit
key to pefectly encrypt n-qubit plaintext, and obtains an n-qubit ciphertext.
According to the key, the algorithm Evaluate∆ replaces each gate in quan-
tum circuit C with its corresponding gate, and gets a new quantum circuit
C ′, and then puts the n-qubit ciphertext as the inputs of C ′. The output
state of C ′ can just be decrypted according to QOTP, and get the result of
performing quantum circuit C on the original plaintext. Thus, this QFHE
scheme permits any n-qubit unitary circuit C to be performed on n qubits
that have been encrypted, and no decryption is needed.
Next, the size of quantum circuit C ′ is analyzed. From the relation
CNOT ′ = CNOT ((−1)j·mZm ⊗Xj), the gate CNOT ′ can be implemented
by at most 3 quantum gates (e.g. CNOT,Z,X). So, while constructing the
new quantum circuit C ′, each CNOT gate in the circuit C is replaced with
at most 3 quantum gates. On the other hand, each single-qubit gate in C ′ is
only corresponding to 1 single-qubit gate. Then, we can conclude that, the
size of the new circuit C ′ is not more than three times of the size of C. Thus,
the complexity of Evaluate∆ is at most three times than that of the circuit
C, and then the algorithm Evaluate∆ is efficient.
It follows from the above analysis that, this scheme is indeed a QFHE
scheme, which permits any n-qubit unitary transformation.
5. Analysis
The security of these QHE and QFHE schemes is analyzed.
Theorem 1: All the QHE and QFHE schemes proposed in the previous
sections are perfectly secure.
Proof: Firstly, it can be verified that [31]
1
22n
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n
XaZbτZbXa =
1
2n
I2n , (9)
where τ is arbitrary n-qubit state.
In all these schemes, QOTP is used as the encryption/decryption algo-
rithm. Suppose the single-qubit plaintext σm is encrypted by QOTP using
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secret key j, k ∈ {0, 1}, which is unknown to the attacker. With regard to the
attacker, the output of the algorithmEncrypt∆ is
1
22
∑
j,k∈{0,1}X
jZkσmZ
kXj,
which is just the totally mixed state according to Eq.(9). Moreover, the out-
put of Evaluate∆ with regard to the attacker is
1
22
∑
j,k∈{0,1}
U(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ)ρcU(α, (−1)jβ, (−1)k+jγ, (−1)jδ)†
=
1
22
∑
j,k∈{0,1}
XjZkU(α, β, γ, δ)σmU(α, β, γ, δ)
†ZkXj =
1
2
I2,
which is also the totally mixed state. Similarly, the same result can be
obtained for the n-qubit QFHE scheme. Thus, with regard to the attacker,
the outputs of the algorithms Encrypt∆ and Evaluate∆ in each QHE/QFHE
scheme are totally mixed states. It means these QHE and QFHE schemes are
also perfectly secure, and the attacker can obtain nothing about the plaintext
and the result of evaluation. 
All the QHE schemes presented here are constructed based on QOTP. It
should be noticed that, the algorithm Evaluate∆ is dependent on the secret
key. This may restrict the application of these schemes, because only the
owner of the secret key can process the encrypted qubits correctly. Does
there exist a QOTP-based symmetric QHE scheme, in which the algorithm
Evaluate∆ is independent of the secret key? Next, we can present a positive
answer to this question.
For convenient, suppose C is a permitted unitary operator in the QHE
scheme, and C ′ is the unitary operator which corresponds to C. The algo-
rithm Evaluate∆ performs C
′ on the ciphertext XjZk|ϕ〉, and can get the
result XjZkC|ϕ〉.
Lemma 1: In the QOTP-based QHE scheme, if the operator C ′ is inde-
pendent of the secret key, and satisfies the condition (XjZk)C = C ′(XjZk),∀j, k,
then C ∈ {eiθI|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}.
Proof: From the above condition, we know (XjZk)C(ZkXj) is indepen-
dent of the secret key j, k. Because {XjZk|k, j ∈ {0, 1}n} is a complete
orthogonal basis in the n-qubit Hilbert space, any n-qubit unitary operator
C can be represented as C =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n αa,bX
aZb. Then
XjZkCZkXj =
∑
a,b∈{0,1}n
αa,b(−1)a·k⊕b·jXaZb,
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where “·” denotes inner product modular 2. Because XjZkCZkXj is inde-
pendent of k, j, it can be deduced that, ∀(k1, j1) 6= (k2, j2),∑
a,b
αa,b
(
(−1)a·k1⊕b·j1 − (−1)a·k2⊕b·j2)XaZb = 0.
So,
αa,b
(
(−1)a·k1⊕b·j1 − (−1)a·k2⊕b·j2) = 0,∀a, b,∀(k1, j1) 6= (k2, j2).
Because it is impossible that αa,b = 0,∀a, b (otherwise C = 0), we have
a · k1 ⊕ b · j1 = a · k2 ⊕ b · j2,∃a, b,∀(k1, j1) 6= (k2, j2).
Then
(a, b) · (k1 − k2, j1 − j2) = 0, ∃a, b,∀(k1 − k2, j1 − j2) 6= (0, 0).
Thus it concludes that (a, b) ≡ (0, 0), and C = α0,0X0Z0 = eiθI2n , ∀θ ∈
[0, 2pi). Thus complete the proof. 
Because the global phase in a quantum state does not influence the result
of measurement (the global phase has no influence on the density matrix), the
condition in Lemma 1 can be relaxed as this: eiβ(XjZk)C = C ′(XjZk),∀j, k,
where β depends on j, k.
Lemma 2: In the QOTP-based QHE scheme, if the operator C ′ is
independent of the secret key, and satisfies the condition eiβ(XjZk)C =
C ′(XjZk),∀j, k, then all the operators in {eiθXaZb|a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}
are permitted unitary operators.
Proof: It can be verified that
(−1)a·k⊕b·j(XjZk)(eiθXaZb) = (eiθXaZb)(XjZk),∀j, k.
Let C = C ′ = eiθXaZb, which is independent of j, k. Thus complete the
proof. 
From the two lemmas, we can conclude the following result.
Theorem 2: If the algorithm Evaluate∆ is independent of the secret key,
then the QOTP-based symmetric QHE scheme permits any of the unitary
operators in the set {eiθXaZb|a, b ∈ {0, 1}n, θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}. 
Now we have shown there exists a symmetric QHE scheme, which satisfies
the condition: Evaluate∆ is independent of the secret key. However, it is
obvious that it cannot be fully homomorphic.
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There is another point that is worth to notice. It can be concluded from
Eq.(1) that, given any T , if the encryption algorithm E is replaced by another
encryption algorithm E ′, then the operation T ′ will changes accordingly. The
relationship between T ′ and T depends on the encryption algorithm E . In all
our schemes, QOTP is chosen as the encryption algorithm, and this makes
for our simple constructions.
6. Discussions
The symmetric QFHE scheme has been constructed. Suppose you have
encrypted a qubit with this scheme, you can perform any single-qubit unitary
operator on the qubit without decryption. If you intend to delegate the
unitary operator to another party, you have to preshare the key with that
party, thus that party may decrypt it and obtain the original qubit. So the
symmetric QFHE scheme proposed here cannot be used in blind computing.
However, you can still delegate the computation to the trusted party by using
the QFHE scheme, which can prevent the malicious parties from obtaining
the data and the result of computation.
The symmetric QFHE scheme may be used in secure multiparty quantum
computation [35, 36], where n parties participate in a computation (e.g. an
evaluation of a unitary circuit C). Suppose the circuit C is given n quantum
inputs and outputs n quantum states, each of which is desired by one party. A
naive multiparty computation protocol is given as follows. Each participant
preshares a secret key with trusted third party (TTP) through quantum key
distribution (QKD), and encrypts his inputs with his secret key according
to the QFHE scheme, and then sends his ciphertext to TTP. TTP performs
quantum circuit C ′ (which is relative to C and all the keys shared between
TTP and every party) on all the ciphertexts, and sends back the results to
each party. Then each party can decrypt the received state with his secret
key, and obtain the desired result.
Besides the homomorphic encryption, blind computing is another kind
of study about privacy-preserving computation. Actually, homomorphic en-
cryption and blind computing are two closely related research directions. Ho-
momorphic encryption scheme can be used in blind computing in the follow-
ing two cases: (1) Homomorphic encryption scheme is symmetric, and the al-
gorithm Evaluate∆ is independent of the key key; (2) Homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme is asymmetric. In blind computing, the decryption f(c)→ f(m)
is unnecessarily the inverse of the encryption m→ c (See Refs.[2, 13]). How-
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ever, in the homomorphic encryption scheme, the decryption algorithm is
just the inverse of the encryption algorithm.
In the QFHE scheme, 2n bits of key are needed to encrypt n qubits with
perfect security. To reduce the length of key, the QOTP can be replaced with
approximate QOTP [37]. However, the security would be slightly weaker.
This paper considers the symmetric QHE, and the asymmetric QHE is
only defined but not constructed. So the open problem is: how to construct
an asymmetric QHE scheme, where the algorithm Evaluate∆ depends only
on the public key pk but not the secret key sk? Or you can consider how
to modify the quantum public-key encryption scheme in Ref.[38], such that
it becomes an asymmetric QHE scheme. If this goal were achieved, the
computing on the quantum ciphertext could be securely outsourced, and
then the blind quantum computing would be implemented in this way.
7. Conclusions
This paper defines symmetric and asymmetric QHE, and proposes four
symmetric QHE schemes that permit all the quantum operators in the set
{Rz(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)}, {Ry(θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2pi)} or {CNOT}. Moreover, we con-
struct a symmetric QFHE scheme, which permits any unitary operator on
single qubit. Then the QFHE scheme is extended to permit any n-qubit uni-
tary operator. All these schemes are constructed based on QOTP, and have
perfect security. In the QFHE scheme, the algorithm Evaluate∆ depends
on the secret key. Finally, we proposed a symmetric QHE scheme, in which
Evaluate∆ is independent of the secret key.
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Appendix
This section lists some commutation rules about the operators X, Y, Z,H,
CNOT,Rz(θ), Ry(θ). Here, j, k, l,m are single-bit numbers.
ZkXj = (−1)j·kXjZk,
Rz(θ)X
j = XjRz((−1)jθ),∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi),
Ry(θ)X
j = XjRy((−1)jθ),∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi),
Ry(θ)Z
k = ZkRy((−1)kθ),∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi),
Ry(θ)H
j = HjRy((−1)jθ),∀θ ∈ [0, 2pi),
CNOT (Xj ⊗ I) = (Xj ⊗Xj)CNOT,
CNOT (Zk ⊗ I) = (Zk ⊗ I)CNOT,
CNOT (I ⊗X l) = (I ⊗X l)CNOT,
CNOT (I ⊗ Zm) = (Zm ⊗ Zm)CNOT.
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